We use minute-by-minute daily transaction-level payments data to document the crosssectional and time-series behavior of the estimated prices and quantities negotiated by commercial banks in the fed funds market. We study the frequency and volume of trade, the size distribution of loans, the distribution of bilateral fed funds rates, and the intraday dynamics of the reserve balances held by commercial banks. We fi nd evidence of the importance of the liquidity provision achieved by commercial banks that act as de facto intermediaries of fed funds.
Introduction
In the United States, financial institutions keep reserve balances at the Federal Reserve Banks to meet requirements, earn interest, or to clear financial transactions. The market for federal funds is an interbank over-the-counter market for unsecured, mostly overnight loans of dollar reserves held at Federal Reserve Banks. The fed funds rate is an average measure of the market interest rate on these loans.
The fed funds market is primarily a mechanism that reallocates reserves among banks: it allows institutions with excess reserve balances to lend reserves to institutions with reserve deficiencies, and therefore helps participants manage reserves and offset liquidity or payment shocks. The fed funds market is also the epicenter of monetary policy implementation, since the Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) periodically chooses a fed funds rate target, and implements monetary policy by instructing the trading desk at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York to create conditions in reserve markets that will encourage fed funds to trade at the target level. In this paper we pry into the micro mechanics of trade in the market for federal funds in order to understand the process of reallocation of liquidity among banks, and the determination of the market price for this liquidity provision-the fed funds rate.
We use minute-by-minute daily transaction-level payments data to provide a quantitative analysis of the cross-sectional and time-series behavior of the estimated prices (fed funds rates) and quantities (frequency and volume of trade, size distribution of loans) negotiated by commercial banks in the fed funds market. Specifically, we study trade volume, the intraday dynamics of the reserve balances held by commercial banks, the importance of the role of commercial banks in the intermediation of funds, and the resulting fed funds rates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the necessary institutional background. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 focuses on the dynamics of the reserve balances held by commercial banks. We find that the distribution of commercial banks' reserve balances follows a clear pattern of daily convergence during the last 2. sectional dimension, we find that trading activity across banks is very skewed: a few banks trade most loans while most banks participate in few trades. For example, the mean number of transactions per bank during the last 2.5 hours of the trading day is typically above the 75th percentile throughout the sample. We document that other measures of the distribution of trading activity across banks, such as the number of counterparties that a bank trades with, the number of counterparties that a bank lends to, and the number of counterparties that a bank borrows from, exhibit similar skewness. The size distribution of loans across banks is also very skewed (albeit less so than the extensive margins). As for the intraday dynamics of trading activity, the frequency of trade (measured by the number of transactions) and overall dollar trade volume tend to decline over the last 90 minutes of the trading session. The pattern for average transaction sizes is similar but milder, and the decline occurs during the last 60 minutes of the trading day. Section 6 documents that some commercial banks, by purchasing funds earlier in the day and reselling them later, play a critical role as de facto intermediaries in the fed funds market. Funds Our estimates seem to confirm a striking aspect of intermediation in this market, namely that a significant number of loans are made by lenders who, based on their balances at the time of the loan, would appear to be themselves in need of funds. We also find that conversely, banks that would appear to be looking to lend, in fact borrow significant amounts of reserves. The distribution of intermediation activity across banks is very skewed, with most banks not intermediating very much. 1 Section 7 focuses on the time-series and the cross-sectional behavior of the distribution of fed funds rates negotiated between pairs of fed funds participants. We find that value-weighted fed funds rate calculated from Fedwire payments data was very close to the FOMC target Furfine (1999 Furfine ( , 2000 , Meulendyke (1998) , and Stigum (1990) , among others.
While purely empirical, the data analysis in this paper is guided by theory: At each step we have let our background model of fed funds trade (Afonso and Lagos, 2012) dictate which empirical relationships are critical to understanding trade dynamics in the fed funds market.
Institutional considerations
The market for federal funds is a market for unsecured loans of reserve balances at the Federal Reserve Banks. These loans, commonly referred to as fed(eral) funds, are delivered on the same day and their duration is typically overnight. 3 The interest rate on these loans is known as the fed funds rate. Participants in the fed funds market include commercial banks, thrift institutions, agencies and branches of foreign banks in the United States, government securities 2 A similar observation but for the effective fed funds rate published daily by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York has been discussed by Hamilton (2008) and studied by Bech and Klee (2011) . 3 There is a term federal funds market where maturities range from a few days to more than a year, with most loans having a maturity of no more than six months. The amount of term federal funds outstanding has been estimated to be on the order of one-tenth to one half of the amount of overnight loans traded on a given day (see Meulendyke, 1998, and Kuo et al., 2010) .
dealers, government agencies such as federal or state governments, and GSEs (e.g., Freddie
Mac, Fannie Mae, and Federal Home Loan Banks). The market for fed funds is a textbook example of an over-the-counter market: in order to trade, a financial institution must first find a willing counterparty, and then bilaterally negotiate the size of the loan and the interest rate.
In practice, there are two ways of trading federal funds. Participants can contact each other directly or they can be matched by a fed funds broker. Non-brokered transactions represent the bulk of the volume of fed funds loans. 4 Most fed funds loans are settled through Fedwire Funds Services (Fedwire), a large-value real-time gross settlement system operated by the Federal Reserve Banks. More than 7,000 Fedwire participants can borrow and lend (or buy and sell, according to traditional terminology) in the fed funds market.
Fedwire operates 21.5 hours each business day, from 21:00 Eastern Time on the preceding calendar day, until 18:30. On a typical day, institutions receive the repayments corresponding to the fed funds sold on the previous day, before they send out the new loans. In 2006, the average value-weighted time of repayment was 15:09 ± 9 minutes, while the average time of delivery was 16:30 ± 7 minutes. The average duration of a loan was 22 hours and 39 minutes. 5 Fed funds activity is concentrated in the last two hours of the operating day. For a typical bank until mid afternoon, Fedwire transactions reflect its primary business activities. Later in the day, the trading and payment activity is orchestrated by the fed funds trading desk and aimed at achieving a target reserve balance. In 2008, more than 75 percent of the value of fed funds traded among banks was traded after 16:00. 6 The motives for trading federal funds vary across participants and their specific circumstances on any given day, but there are two main reasons in general. First, some institutions such as commercial banks use the fed funds market to offset the effects on their reserve balances of transactions (either initiated by their clients or by profit centers within the banks themselves) that would otherwise leave them with a reserve position that does not meet Federal Reserve regulations. 7 Also, some participants regard fed funds as an investment vehicle; an interest-yielding asset that can be used to "deposit" large balances overnight. 4 Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) report that non-brokered transactions represented 73 percent of the volume of federal funds traded in 2005. Fed funds brokers do not take positions themselves; they only act as matchmakers, bringing buyers and sellers together.
5 This is documented in Bech and Atalay (2008) . 6 In line with this observation, Bartolini et al. (2005) report very high fed funds loan activity during the latter part of the trading session. See also the illustrations of intraday loan networks for each half hour in a trading day in Figure 6 of Bech and Atalay (2008 9 Examples of such settlement institutions are the Depository Trust Company (a securities settlement system), or the Clearing House Interbank Payments System (a private large-value U.S. dollar payment system). 10 For example, consider a $100 million loan sent from bank i to bank j on Tuesday, matched to a $100.02 million send from bank j to bank i on the following Wednesday. Since 100.02/100 = 1 + 0.072/360, this transaction is interpreted as a $100 million overnight loan from i to j with a 7.2 percent (annualized) interest rate.
11 The brokered data is from a daily survey of the four largest fed funds brokers published by the Markets Group of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
12 Eurodollar loans are identfied by using as a proxy the customer code that a sending bank enters on the payment message indicating that the payment is made on behalf of a customer. McAndrews (2009) tests the predictive power of the costumer code as a proxy for a Eurodollar loan by matching brokered trades provided by
In this paper, whenever we refer to any aspect of fed funds transactions, we are actually referring to the subset of Fedwire transactions that were identified as fed funds loans by the algorithm described above. Despite its widespread use and general appeal, the algorithm may keep transactions that are not fed funds trades, or may discard transactions that are fed funds trades. Transactions identified as overnight fed funds loans by the algorithm may include other kinds of overnight loans settled over Fedwire, such as Eurodollar, tri-party repos, correspondent lending, and term fed funds, among others. Fed funds loans with unusually high or low rates relative to the daily effective brokered rates, and loans not settled through Fedwire may be missed by the algorithm. The algorithm will miss loans between correspondent banks and their client banks. It may also misidentify counterparties. For example, an overnight loan made by some firm A who is a client of bank i, to a firm B who is a client of bank j, could be misclassified as a fed funds loan from bank i to bank j. With Fedwire data it is not possible to identify which loans are brokered. 13 Subject to these caveats, the data set we study includes information on the amount of the loan, implicit interest rate, date, time of delivery and time of return, as well as the identity of the borrower and lender for every transaction executed over Fedwire. The borrower and lender are identified at the lead American Banking Association level, which corresponds to a unique identifier assigned to institutions by the Federal Reserve. The fed funds data are aggregated at the bank holding company level, dropping transactions between entities of the same bank holding company. Unless otherwise specified, we restrict our sample to transactions in which at least one of the institutions is a commercial bank, and specialize the analysis to transactions that occur in the last 2.5 hours of the Fedwire business day, between 16:00 and 18:30. 14 In addition to Fedwire data, we use an independent data set available to the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, that documents the reserve balance of each account at the end of every minute during every daily Fedwire trading session in our sample. These balances are aggregated BGC Brokers with Fedwire settlement data. By using the absence of a costumer code as a proxy for fed funds, the probability of correctly identifying fed funds loans is 89%, with an 11% chance of counting Eurodollars as fed funds (Type I error) and a 4% chance of incorrectly excluding fed funds (Type II error). 13 The Federal Reserve Bank of New York is currently concerned about the accuracy of the Furfine estimates; efforts to assess how large are the Type I and Type II errors resulting from the application of this algorithm are currently underway.
14 Fed funds activity is concentrated in the last two hours of the operating day, e.g., in 2008 more than 75 percent of the value of fed funds traded among banks was traded after 4pm. For this reason, it is standard to focus on the last segment of the trading session. Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) , for example, restrict their empirical analysis to the last 1.5 hours of the business day. This normalization controls for bank size. 17 The fed funds market is primarily a mechanism that reallocates dollar funds (in the form of reserve balances at Federal Reserve Banks) among financial institutions. 16 By "total daily amount of reserves sent" we mean over the whole trading day, not just the last 2.5 hours. Also, notice that f Each panel in Figure 17 illustrates the evolution of the distribution of reserve balances for a "synthetic day" corresponding to each of the six years in our sample. To get a sense of how representative these "synthetic days" are, we have generated the intraday box plots for actual trading days drawn at random from each year in our sample, and typically found the same patterns that we emphasized when discussing Figure 17 . Figure 18 shows six of these random 
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Intraday dynamics of trading activity
In this section we document how trading activity, as measured by the various dimensions of trade volume, is distributed throughout the trading day. We begin with Figure 8 In the remainder of the section we document a striking aspect of intermediation in this market, namely that a significant number of loans are made by lenders who, based on their balances at the time of the loan, would appear to be themselves in need of funds. 31 In addition, we find that banks who would appear to be looking to lend (based on their balances at the time of the transaction), in fact sometimes borrow significant amounts of reserves. To this end, as in Section 4, let a h sty denote the reserve balance held by bank h at time s, on trading day t of year y. Also let f h ty denote the amount of reserves recorded as sent over Fedwire by bank h on trading day t of year y, and let f h y be the average for year y of the total daily amount of reserves sent by bank h, i.e., f h y = . For each year in our sample, each panel in Figure 23 shows thirty one box plots (each corresponding to a given time-of-day in S) of the 31 This fact was also pointed out by Ashcraft and Duffie (2007), who report: "A significant number of loans in our data are made by lenders in the lower deciles by relative balances. Many of these lenders are presumably themselves in relative need of funds but agree to lend at a sufficiently high rate, planning to borrow later in the day at a lower rate. In any OTC market, the borrower does not generally know the most attractive rates available from other counterparties, or which counterparties are offering them, and may have an incentive to accept the rate offered by such a lender." See Afonso and Lagos (2012) for a theory of trade in the fed funds market in which these types of loans arise naturally in equilibrium.
32 By "total daily amount of reserves sent" we mean over the whole trading day, not just the last 2.5 hours of the trading session. Also, notice that f 
Fed funds rates
There is no such thing as the fed funds rate. Rather, in any small interval of time during a fed funds trading session, there is a distribution of fed funds rates being agreed upon in bilateral transactions between borrowers and lenders. In this section we document both the time-series and the cross sectional behavior of these bilateral rates.
The left panel of Figure 12 plots the daily average value-weighted fed funds rate calculated To offer another angle on the volatility of the fed funds rate, letρ t denote the value-weighted 
The left panel of Figure 13 plots the daily value of D t , i.e., the deviations between value-weighted daily fed funds rate and 
Intraday dynamics of the distribution of fed fund rates
Let ρ i sty be the rate on loan i extended at time s, on day t of year y. Defineρ sty = ∑ Isty i=1 ω i sty ρ i sty , where I sty is the number of transactions at time s on day t of year y, and ω i sty is the ratio of the value of loan i to the total value of all loans traded at time s during day t of year y. Intuitively, ρ sty is the average value-weighted fed funds rate at time s of day t in year y. For each year in our sample period, each panel in Figure 25 shows thirty one box plots (each corresponding to a given time-of-day) of the spread, σ i sty ≡ ρ i sty −ρ sty , at five-minute intervals from 16:00 until 18:30, throughout the year. Specifically, each box plot shows, for a given time-of-day s and year y, the distribution of observations, {σ i sty }, for all (i, t) pairs, i.e., for all loans and trading days in the year. By pooling all trading days in a given year, Figure 25 Figure 15 shows the effective fed funds rate. 35 Strikingly, the effective fed funds rate has been consistently lower than the 25 basis points that the Federal Reserve pays on reserves held by commercial banks. 36 The left panel of Figure 16 shows the average value-weighted fed funds rate 35 These data are available at http://www.newyorkfed.org/markets/omo/dmm/fedfundsdata.cfm.
36 Some large lenders in the federal funds market which are non-depository institutions, such as the GSEs, do not receive interest on their reserve balances. It has been argued (see Bech and Klee, 2011 ) that such institutions Given that commercial banks can earn 25 risk-free basis points from the Fed overnight, why are there commercial banks lending reserves at rates lower than 25 basis points?
Concluding remarks
In the previous sections we used Fedwire transactions data filtered by a standard Furfine algorithm to document some key stylized facts of the interbank overnight loan market in the United
States. Our empirical analysis has been guided by theory in that the variables we have chosen to study are the ones that the model developed in Afonso and Lagos (2012) identifies as being The theoretical framework that economists use to frame and organize policy discussions about the fed funds market is the static competitive model of Poole (1968) . Recent empirical studies (e.g., Ashcraft and Duffie, 2007) have suggested, however, that a dynamic search-based theory may be a more useful framework to interpret the wealth of available price and quantity estimates of fed funds transactions. 37 Our findings lend support to this view. The prevalence of price dispersion, the pervasiveness of intermediation among commercial banks, and the daily pattern of gradual convergence of reserve balances, are hallmarks of a trading process mediated by search. We interpret these findings as prima facie evidence in favor of the usefulness of a search-based theory of the fed funds market. 37 Ashcraft and Duffie (2007) focus on two variables: transaction pairing likelihood, and the fed funds rate negotiated between two commercial banks. They analyze the determinants of the likelihood of a loan by institution i to institution j in minute t of the trading day. They find a strong relationship between counterparty balances and the probability of a fed funds loan, specifically, that a high balance (relative to normal for that minute) increases the probability of being a lender, while a low balance increases the probability of being a borrower. As for the fed funds rates, they study the determinants of the cross-sectional spread (at a given minute s) of the rate negotiated by a particular lender i and borrower j, net of the current minute, dollar weighted average rate negotiated elsewhere in the market. Let this spread be denoted byσ 
